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Since the reform and opening up, China’s economy has been 
maintained rapid growth rate. Among the 35 years from 1978 to 2012, 
the average annual growth rate of GDP in China has been reached 9.8%, 
while the world economy over the same period has only reached 2.8%. 
this phenomenon is also known as “China’s Miracle of Growth”. 
In the process of China's development, local officials have played 
a positive and important role. In the study of the mechanism of local 
officials’ influence on promoting the local economic growth, two main 
explanations emerged - financial incentives and political incentives. 
Through the previous research, we found that in the governance system 
of Chinese officials, under the political promotion incentives, local 
officials "competition for growth". In order to effectively promote 
the area’s economic growth, and need to seek more disposable resources, 
and land revenue as the main source of government budget revenue, local 
officials will have great enthusiasm of the land revenue, and higher 
prices of real estate will inevitably spur premium increases in the 
prices of land. Thus, in China's unique political incentives, city's 
higher housing prices and local officials' interests are closely 
related with each other, and has become an important measure of local 
officials in the political competition in the promotion. Therefore,   
this paper has carried on the thorough exploration, take the originals, 
the directions of local officials has gone and the tenure of the local 
officials into consideration, to study the impact of local officials 
in the area on housing prices. 
In this paper, based on the 14 years among 2000 to 2013, 35 major 
















macroeconomic panel data, to analyze the official replacement, remote 
communication and tenure of the impact on the urban housing prices. 
Through the research, this paper found that the influence of different 
types of mayor's and party secretary’s on city housing prices has a 
significant difference. Specifically, from the point of view of the 
officials’ sources, outsiders’ housing prices during their tenures 
was significantly higher than the locals; from the point of view of 
where the officials had gone after they leave their positions, the 
whereabouts of the mayor and the secretary of the municipal Party has 
significantly different influence on the local housing prices, 
officials who leave to the other provinces, the housing prices during 
their tenures are significantly higher than the others; besides, there 
exists heterogeneity in the effect of mayor of secretary of municipal 
Party committee of urban housing prices, officials will according to 
their own history background of urban housing prices have an impact. 
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的是各大城市在 2000 年-2013年这 14年间的年度样本数据进行研究分析，但考
虑到城市房价变动的特殊性，为了进一步验证本文结论的稳健性，本文将面板数




























































Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations Database”.  
Fulltexts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on 
http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit requests online, or consult the interlibrary 
loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn 
for delivery details. 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
